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Volume XXII FEBRUARY, 1937 Number 2
THE SECOND ATTACK ON PRICE DISCRIMINATION:
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
MILO FOWLER HAMILTONt AND LEE LOEVINGERt
The Robinson-Patman Act, passed in the closing days of the
last Congress,, has aroused a storm of protest and discussion
among the business men and lawyers since the day of its pas-
sage.2 The sweeping changes in traditional business methods
t Member Kansas City, Missouri Bar. B. C. L. (Oxon.).
* Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. The act was passed by the House on June 15, 1936, by the Senate on
June 18, 1936; and was signed by the President and became effective on
June 19, 1936. 49 Stat. 1426, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 13 et seq.
2. Business Week for June 20, 1936, page 13, says: "From hundreds of
trade association offices throughout the country this week, issued analyses
and interpretations of the Patman-Robinson anti-price-discrimination mea-
sure, suggestions and warnings couched in language that left little doubt of
the widespread alterations which the enactment of this amendment to the
Clayton Act will effect in marketing operations." The newspapers have re-
ported numerous trade association meetings and conferences of business
men called to discuss the effect of this legislation. See Kansas City Times,
Oct. 4, 1936, p. 5. The act has been widely discussed in the various trade
journals. See Northwestern Miller, July 29, 1936, p. 277, August 26, 1936,
p. 541, and Sept. 9, 1936, p. 693. And there have already been various legal
discussions of the act published. See Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Dis-
crimination Act (1936) 22 A. B. A. Journal 593; Robertson, The Robinson-
Patnman Act (Nov. 1936) 14 Fortune Mag. 96; Note, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106
(1936); Gaskill, Report on the Price Discrimination Law (Kiplinger Wash-
ington Agency). The last mentioned book is the most pretentious publica-
tion on this subject up to the present, but from a legal point of view it
seems the least competent comment thus far made. Thus on page 61 appears
the following, in reference to proceedings for violation of the act: "To all
questions which may be put to either challenged party by any one, all he
has to say is 'I decline to answer on the ground that my answer might in-
criminate me.' And having made this answer there is no power on earth
which can compel him to answer questions about his conduct." This is
precisely wrong. An individual cannot be prosecuted under the anti-trust
laws for any transaction concerning which he produces evidence (15 U. S.
C. A. sec. 32); and because of this immunity, an individual may be forced
to testify, regardless of possible incrimination, concerning violations of the
anti-trust laws; or he may be imprisoned for contempt for failure to testify
when subpoened. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 371, 50 L. ed. 652
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which appear to be threatened by an enforcement of this law, 3
the alacrity with which the Federal Trade Commission is insti-
tuting proceedings under it,4 together with the confusion as to
its meaning caused by a lack of authoritative definition of many
of its terms together with the unprecedented awkwardness with
which the law has been drafted, may justify some of the furor.
However, a study of the law with regard for merely its legal
significance should do much to reassure lawyers and business
men that this law is not the beginning of a social revolution.
Price discrimination in interstate commerce has been under
the ban of law for over twenty-two years. The first attack upon
price discrimination by the federal government was made with
the passage of the Clayton Act5 in 1914. At that time it was
generally felt that the Sherman Act, particularly after the "rule
of reason" had been read into it by judicial construction, was
inadequate for the purpose of curbing monopolies., Conse-
(1906); Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 63 F. (2d)
778 (C. C. A. 2, 1933).
3. The opinion of most business men is indicated by the quotation in
note 2, supra. One commentator expresses himself more strongly. He says
that as to the effect of the act, predictions vary. "The mildest is that it
will eventually disturb and change the buying and selling practices of all
manufacturers, jobbers and merchants, large and small.... Again... the
Act is seen as giving the coup de grace to traditional wholesale, jobbing,
and retail methods of distribution, shaken as they already are by chain-
store competition; .... Whatever may be thought of these varied prophe-
cies and interpretations, this much is clear: apart from recent familiar
legislation which has been condemned by the Supreme Court, the present
Act, in any view, represents the most far-reaching encroachment upon
'liberty of contract', and upon the right to control and use private property,
that has yet been attempted in this country." Robertson, The Robinson-
Patman Act (Nov. 1936) 14 Fortune Mag. 96.
4. At the date of writing (December 15, 1936) the Federal Trade Com-
mission had issued ten complaints against nineteen respondents under this
act.
5. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, chap. 323, 38 Stat. 730 et seq., 15 U. S. C. A.
sec. 12 et seq.
6. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct. 572, 64
L. ed. 993 (1920), Brandeis, J., dissenting, at page 432 et seq.; "In 1890
Congress passed the Sherman Law. . . . Between 1906 and 1913 reports
were made by the Federal Bureau of Corporations of its investigations into
the petroleum industry, the tobacco industry, the steel industry and the
farm implement industry .... And in 1911 this court rendered its decision
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, and in United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106. The conviction became general in
America, that the legislation of the past had been largely ineffective. There
was general agreement that further legislation was desirable. . . . The
latter view prevailed in the Sixty-Third Congress. The Clayton Act (Octo-
ber 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730) was framed largely with a view to making
more effective the remedies given by the Sherman Law."
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quently the Clayton Act was passed for the purpose of prevent-
ing monopolies through the prohibition of certain specific trade
practices, which7 were thought to lead to their creation. Price
discrimination between buyers was one of the trade practices
thus prohibited. By Section 2 of the Clayton Act it was unlaw-
ful to discriminate in price between purchasers of commodities
where 1) one of the transactions involved was in interstate com-
merce and the goods were not intended for export; 2) the dis-
crimination related to commodities of like grade, quality, and
quantity; 3) the effect of the discrimination was either to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce; the section further providing that it was
not discriminatory; 4) to make due allowance for differences in
the cost of selling or transporting; 5) to select customers in bona
fide transactions; and 6) to allow differences in price in good
faith to meet competition8
The provision of the Clayton Act requiring a discriminatory
difference to relate to sales of like quantity was, for many years,
7. Standard Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 42 S. Ct. 360,
66 L. ed. 753 (1922), at pp. 355-6: "The Clayton Act, as its title and the
history of its enactment disclose, was intended to supplement the purpose
and effect of other anti-trust legislation, principally the Sherman Act of
1890.... The Clayton Act sought to reach the agreements embraced within
its sphere in their incipiency, and in the section under consideration to deter-
mine their legality by specific tests of its own. . . ." Standard Oil Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 282 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 3, 1922) aff'd. 261 U. S.
463, 43 S. Ct. 450, 67 L. ed. 746 (1923) at page 86: "The Clayton Act,
which is a part of the scheme of laws against unlawful restraints and
monopolies, does not wait for its operation until monopolies have been cre-
ated and restraints of trade established, but seeks to reach them in their
incipiency and stop their growth."
8. Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 13, reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities, which commodi-
ties are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States
or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination
in price between purchasers of commodities on account of differences
in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes
only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transporta-
tion, or discrimination in price in the same or different communities
made in good faith to meet competition: And provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling
goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade."
19371
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one of the largest loopholes of the law. Unimportant differences
in the quantity of sales were made the basis for large differ-
ences in price, and preferred customers were allowed dispropor-
tiolately large discounts for quantity purchases.9 However, it
was obvious that this was merely a method for the evasion of
the law, and in recent proceedings before the Federal Trade
Commission it was finally stated in unequivocal terms that this
practice was unlawful, and that quantity discounts were justified
under the law only where they were reasonably related to a dif-
ference in cost resulting from the quantity of the sale.10
Since the anti-trust acts were designed to protect competi-
tion,1 price discrimination was made unlawful only if it had the
effect "substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." While the courts have not
always been meticulous in distinguishing between these two ef-
fects, discrimination has been held unlawful where it appeared
likely either to eliminate an individual competitor,12 or to pro-
mote a monopoly. 13 The discrimination was unlawful if the pro-
9. See Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Chain Store
Investigation, Sen. Doc. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, p. 24 et seq.
10. Re Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., F. T. C. No. 2116 (1936) (now
pending on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.)
11. American Column Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 377, 42 S. Ct. 114,
66 L. ed. 284, 21 A. L. R. 1093 (1921), at page 400: "It has been repeatedly
held by this court that the purpose of the statute (Sherman Anti-Trust
Act) is to maintain free competition in interstate commerce .... " Oxford
Varnish Co. v. Ault & Wiborg Co., 83 Fed. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 6, 1936),
at page 767: "The clear purpose of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 730) is to
preserve legitimate competition.... ." Donovan, Need for Revision of Anti-
Trust Laws (1936) 22 A. B. A. Journal 797, "The Sherman Law embodies
the principle of competition upon which our American civilization was
largely built."
12. Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, 40 F. (2d)
620 (C. C. A. 7, 1930), at page 625: "The elimination of plaintiff as a
competitor in this line of commerce would necessarily tend to a certain
extent to create a monopoly and also to substantially lessen competition."
Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F. (2d)
234 (C. C. A. 2, 1929) cert. den., 279 U. S. 858, 49 S. Ct. 353, 73 L. ed.
999 (1929) at page 237: "If this competition, resulting in such loss, con-
tinued, it is fair to assume that the appellee could not continue in business,
and its elimination as a competitor was certain. Thus the appellant's dis-
crimination will substantially lessen competition."
13. Standard Co. v. Magrane Houston Co., supra, note 6, at page 356:
"Section 3 condemns sales or agreements where the effect of such sale or
contract of sale 'may' be to substantially lessen competition or tend to cre-
ate a monopoly.... But we do not think that the purpose in using the
word 'may' was to prohibit the mere possibility of the consequences de-
scribed. It was intended to prevent such agreements as would under the
circumstances disclosed probably lessen competition, or create an actual
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss2/1
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
hibited effect appeared in any line of commerce, regardless of
whether it was one in which the seller or the buyer was en-
gaged: 4
By showing a discrimination that included the first four con-
ditions enumerated above, a prima facie case of violation of the
Clayton Act was made out.15 The burden was then upon the de-
fendant to go forward with the evidence either disproving the
evidence of the other side, or bringing the discrimination within
the justification of one of the last three conditions. Thus, differ-
ences in cost, the selection of customers, and the meeting of com-
petition, were affirmative defenses upon which the defendant
bore the burden of proofY
However, this burden of proof was not a heavy one, since the
claim of such a defense was easy to set up, whereas the evidence
to disprove it was generally unavailable to the opposing party.
Thus, because of the ease with which a charge of price discrimi-
nation could be justified as a meeting of competition, or as a
quantity discount, and because of the great difficulty of showing
the effect necessary to tinge the discrimination with illegality,
proceedings under the act, whether begun by the Federal Trade
Commission or by a private litigant, were very rare, and seldom
successful.17 As a result, the practices which the Clayton Act was
designed to prevent flourished under it. Large buyers such as
chain stores and mail order houses used the advantage given
them by the volume of their sales to force sellers and manufac-
tendency to monopoly. That it was not intended to reach every remote
lessening of competition is shown in the requirement that such lessening
must be substantial."
14. Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 112,
73 L. ed. 311 (1929), overruling on this point Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2, 1923), cert. den. 262 U. S. 759, 43
S. Ct. 705, 67 L. ed. 1219 (1923) ; and National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2, 1924) cert. den., 266 U. S. 613, 45
S. Ct. 95, 69 L. ed. 468 (1924).
15. Gibson Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 1 F. Supp. 242 (D. C. Ill.,
1932) and cases cited in footnote 16.
16. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A.
7, 1930); Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., (D. C. N. Y., 1936) 16 F.
Supp. 784; see Sidney Morris & Co. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Stationers ,40 F. (2d)
620, 625 (C. C. A., 7, 1930) and cases cited in footnote 14, supra.
17. In the twenty-two years since the enactment of the Clayton Act only
seventeen suits have been instituted under the price discrimination section,
and in only six of these has a violation of the section been established.
Considering the wide scope of the law, and the tremendous breadth of its
purpose, this is indeed a remarkable record.
1937]
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turers to grant them discriminations in the form of dispropor-
tionate quantity discounts, fake brokerage payments, or adver-
tising allowances which were unavailable to other customers."9
I
The Robinson-Patman Act was the second attack by Congress
upon these practices, 9 and was designed to put teeth into Section
2 of the Clayton Act.2 1 The seeds of this amendment were
planted by the report rendered to the Senate by the Federal
Trade Commission on chain stores, 21 and were tenderly nurtured
by the interested groups. Although it originated as anti-chain
store legislation, regard for constitutional inhibitions against
class legislation gave it a general character. It is very doubtful
whether the implications of the law were fully realized by either
its supporters and opponents, or by the legislators.22
18. See Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Chain Stores,
Sen. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, at pps. 24, 61 and 62; see also
footnote 20, infra.
19. Much recent legislation, such as the National Industrial Recovery
Act and the Guffey Coal Act, has attempted to fix prices, and so has neces-
sarily prevented price discrimination. But this result has been merely inci-
dental to the primary purpose of such legislation, which is actually promul-
gated on a theory quite the contrary of the anti-trust legislation. See Ter-
borgh, Price Control Devices in N. R. A. Codes (1934, Brookings Institu-
tion).
20. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936); H. R. Rep. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936). See, Business Week, June 13, 1936, at
page 13: "Briefly the bill would require a seller to extend to all customers
who buy from him the same quantities the same net prices on goods of the
same kind and quality, unless differentials in discounts can be justified on
the basis of different selling, transportation, or manufacturing costs. In
its general aspects this is the same objective which was written into the
existing Clayton Act 22 years ago. But the broad provisions of the Clayton
Act have proved unenforceable; the big mass distributors have been able
to secure discounts, commissions, and allowances on their bulk orders which
old-line middlemen have contended were tantamount to price discrimina-
tions against them and their customers. This situation led to the pending
Patman amendment, which seeks to define price discrimination on more de-
tailed and narrow grounds and to couch the prohibitions against it in much
more emphatic and realistic language."
21. Sen. Doe. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935.
22. Thus Senator Van Nuys thought that the Act allowed the meeting
of competition as a defense under any proceeding brought under any sec-
tion. 80 Cong. Rec. 10017 (1936). While the conference managers of the
House of Representatives thought that no such defense existed and that
evidence that the discrimination was made to meet competition was admis-
sible only in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission. Conference
Report and Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House (1936)
80 Cong. Rec. 9410-9411. See also the conflicting testimony as to the effect
of the law given at the committee hearings. Hearings Before a Subeom-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss2/1
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The new act contains two sections which deal with price dis-
crimination.2 1 Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act is an
amendment of Section 2 of the Clayton Act,24 while Section 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act is a completely new law on the subject
invoking criminal penalties for its enforcement. 25 Subdivision
(a) of Section 121 forbids price discrimination between purchas-
ers in the sale of commodities where:
mittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciarj, 74th Cong. 2nd. Sess., on
S. 4147 (March 24th and 25th, 1936), and Hearings Before a Subcommittee
in the House of Rep. Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong. 2nd Sess. on
H. R. 4995, H. R. 8442, and H. R. 10486. (February 3, 4, 5, and 7th, 1936).
23. The Robinson-Patman Act consists of four sections. Sections 1 and 3
deal with price discrimination and will be dealt with in detail in the body
of this article and in the other footnotes. Section 2 of the act provides that
nothing contained in the act "shall affect rights of action arising, or litiga-
tion pending, or orders of the Federal Trade Commission issued and in
effect or pending on review, based on section 2" of the Clayton Act; and
that proceedings now pending under the Clayton Act may be continued and
modified to include investigations of possible violations of the act as now
amended. The principal purpose in the enactment of this section was to
preserve the voluminous proceedings of the Commission in the case of Re
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., supra, note 10. 80 Cong. Rec. 8436 (1936).
Section four of the acts provides: "Nothing in this Act shall prevent a
cooperative association from returning to its members, producers, or con-
sumers the whole, or any part of, the net earnings or surplus resulting
from its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases or sales from,
to, or through the association." The purpose and effect of this section is
apparent from a reading of it. Neither of these two sections is considered
elsewhere in this article.
24. This is clear from the enacting clause of the Robinson-Patman Act
which provides as follows: "An Act to amend Section 2 of the Act entitled
'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and
monopolies, and for other purposes,' approved October 15, 1914 as amended
(15 U. S. C., sec. 13), and for other purposes."
Thus the first section of the Robinson-Patman Act is designated "Sec. 2"
and is set off from the other sections by quotation marks. However through-
out this article this section will be referred to as Section 1 and all refer-
ences to Section 2 of the Clayton Act will be to that section as it was prior
to this amendment. Because this section of the act is an amendment of the
Clayton Act all the general provisions of that law apply to it. See notes
27, and 83-87, infra.
25. See notes 19, 21, and 22 for a discussion of the history of this section.
See notes 90 to 100 and the text thereto for a discussion of the provisions
of section 3.
26. Subdivision (a) of Section 1 of the Act reads as follows:
"Sec. 2. (a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly,
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases in-
volved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodi-
ties are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States
or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
19371
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1) one of the transactions involved is in interstate commerce, 21
and the goods are not intended for export;
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimina-
tion, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allow-
ance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery re-
sulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such com-
modities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, however,
That the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation and
hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and
revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or
classes of commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in
greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account
thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line
of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit
differentials based on differences in quantities greater than those so
fixed and established: and provided further, That nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or mer-
chandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona-
fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: and provided further,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time
to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market
for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not
limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, ob-
solescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or
sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods con-
cerned."
27. By requiring that only one of the transactions need be in interstate
commerce, Congress clearly intended the act also to apply to intrastate
transactions which, when considered in relation to interstate transactions,
result in discrimination. There is some question as to the constitutionality
of this provision of the law. Congress apparently relied upon the doctrine
of the Shreveport Rate Case (Houston and Texas Ry., v. United States,
234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 48 L. ed. 1341 (1914) to sustain its power
over such intrastate transactions. See Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1936); H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936); H. R.
Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936); and 80 Cong. Rec. 9559. The
constitutional questions raised by this law are beyond the scope of this
article. For a suggestive popular treatment of the constitutionality of vari-
ous provisions of the act, see, Robertson, The Robinson-Patman Act (Nov.,
1936) 14 Fortune Mag. 96.
In this connection it should be noted that there is some conflict among
the various provisions of the law as to the fields of commerce to which they
apply. Thus subdivision (a) applies in certain cases to interstate trans-
actions but does not apply to sales for export. The remaining subdivisions
of that section do not apply to any intrastate transactions but because they
are part of the Clayton Act and because "commerce" as used in that law is
defined to include foreign commerce (38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 12)
those subdivisions relate to sales made in the course of such commerce.
Section 3 of the act (see infra, note 93) is not part of the Clayton Act,
consequently if a literal interpretation were given to it, it would apply to
all commerce, intrastate and interstate alike and of course would then be
unconstitutional. It seems likely that this section will be limited in its
application to interstate commerce.
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2) the discrimination relates to conmodities 28 of like grade
and quality ;29
3) the effect of the discrimination may be (a) substantially
to lessen competition, (b) to tend to create a monopoly,30 or
(c) to injure, destroy, or prevent competition 3' with either the
buyer or the seller or the customers of either of them; and pro-
vided that:
1) due allowance for differences in cost resulting from dif-
fering methods or quantities of sale is not prohibited ;32
2) selection of customers in good faith is not prohibited;33
3) price changes merely reflecting changes in market con-
ditions are not prohibited ;34 and,
4) price differentials granted in good faith merely to meet
competition are not prohibited.3
The terms used in the new act which are the same as those
used in the former law, will undoubtedly be given the same defi-
nitions. Since this subdivision is substantially a reenactment of
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, no new difficulties are presented as
to most of the terms used.3 6 Indeed, confusion rather than clear-
28. The Act applies only to sales of commodities; it does not apply to
contracts of employment or service. Thus in Fleetway Inc. v. Public Ser-
vice Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 3, 1934) cert. den.,
293 U. S. 626, 55 S. Ct. 347, 79 L. ed. 713 (1935) in which it was held that
Section 2 of the Clayton Act did not apply to contracts for the carrying of
passengers by hire, it was said, "The section prevents discrimination in
price between different purchasers of commodities which are sold for use,
consumption or resale within the United States, etc. This clearly refers to
a commodity such as merchandise, and has no reference to transportation
of passengers by busses." See also Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co.,
252 U. S. 436, 442, 40 S. Ct. 385, 64 L. ed. 649 (1920).
29. Where goods are not identical, the question of what constitutes "like
grade and quality" will be a question of fact. For a discussion of the
factors to be considered see text to note 39.
30. This phrase and the one preceding it have been defined in several
cases under the Clayton Act, so that their scope, if not their precise defini-
tion, is not open to serious question. See supra, notes 12 & 13. Cf. Gordon,
Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act (1936) 22 A. B. A. Journal
593.
31. For a discussion of the extent to which this is intended to prevent an
injury to competition see note 12 and text thereto.
32. For discussion see infra, notes 52 to 53, and text thereto.
33. For discussion see infra, notes 55 to 62, and text thereto.
34. For discussion see p. 173 et seq., infra.
35. The preceding six conditions are merely restatements of express pro-
visions in the law. The seventh condition is a statement merely of the
author's own conclusion, which is based on inference and is not altogether
free from doubt. For discussion see infra, notes 73 to 75, and text thereto.
36. The only important phrase which appears in this subdivision which
is not in the previous law, is the phrase "to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition."
19371
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ness is likely to result by attempting to render a priori definitions
of terms that are essentially questions of fact rather than of law.
Thus the questions of what constitutes a "due allowance" for the
difference in cost resulting from the difference in quantity of a
sale can be answered only in the general language of good busi-
ness practice and fair dealing. Ordinarily this must remain a
question for the jury. However such indefiniteness is not with-
out precedent, for, after several hundred years, no more ade-
quate definition of negligence has been given.
Two concepts are essential to a clear understanding of the
nature of this law-discrimination and competition. Discrimina-
tion is a quality of the relationship existing between two sales
with differing prices. No transaction can be discriminatory
per se, for discrimination exists only when there is a certain
relationship existing between two or more transactions. Further-
more this relationship must be more than a mere difference, for
it must be a difference so substantial as to be unfair under all
of the circumstances.3 7 Probably the act does not prohibit what
Mr. Justice Holmes has called the "small dishonesties of trade."'8
The concept of discrimination seems to be that required by pre-
vailing ideas of business morality based upon the accepted laissez
faire economic philosophy.
Closely associated with the concept of discrimination is the
provision requiring that the discrimination should relate to com-
modities of like grade and quality. Indeed, on purely a priori
grounds, it is apparent that before there can be a difference there
must be a basic similarity, in terms of which the difference de-
rives its character. Lacking a similarity in the goods that were
the subject matter of the sales, the definition of discrimination
would become exceedingly difficult. Consequently, it may be as-
serted that under this act there are not two separate questions,
one as to discrimination and one as to similarity of goods, but
37. As Congressman Utterback said in explaining this bill to the house,
"In its meaning as simple English a discrimination is more than a mere
difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some rela-
tionship exists between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them
to equal treatment, whereby the difference granted to one casts some burden
or disadvantage upon the other." 80 Cong. Rec. 9559 (1936). See United
States v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 161 Fed. 606, 610 (C. C., Ill., 1908).
38. See Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 378, 33 S. Ct. 780, 57
L. ed. 1233 (1913).
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that in every case the single question is whether or not there
has been a discrimination as to like grades and qualities.'
If this analysis be correct, then it follows that the standard for
determining similarity and dissimilarity in grade and quality
must be a commercial one, just as the standard by which a dif-
ference is judged to be a discrimination is commercial. Conse-
quently, goods may be identical from a functional viewpoint, and
be of equal value from a scienctific viewpoint, and nevertheless
be of different grade and quality from a commercial viewpoint,
because of a difference in their economic utility. Mere difference
in name, design, or notoriety probably will not suffice to distin-
guish commodities from one another; but a genuine difference
in commercial value, even though arising solely from these fac-
tors, seems certain to justify a difference in price.
II
As has been pointed out, the purpose of the anti-trust laws is
to protect competition," and therefore the Clayton Act prohibited
only that discrimination which tended to lessen competition or
create a monopoly. Such discrimination is prohibited also under
the Robinson-Patman Act. Even under the former law it was
recognized that competition depends upon the existence of com-
petitors; and therefore it was held that the elimination of a com-
petitor was a lessening of competition.4 1 The new law carries
this proposition a step further by establishing the rule that in-
jury to a competitor is pro tanto injury to competition; and ac-
cordingly discrimination is unlawful where the effect may be
"to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with" (1) the seller,
(2) the purchaser, (3) the customers of the seller, or (4) the
customers of the purchaser.42
39. It is interesting to note in this connection that Section 2 of the Clay-
ton Act, footnote 8, supra, prohibited discrimination in the sale of com-
modities, and then added a provision that there might be discrimination
"on account of difference in the grade, quality, or quantity." On the other
hand, the Robinson Patman Act prohibits discrimination as to "commodi-
ties of like grade and quality." Cf. Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71
F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 8, 1934) cert. den., 293 U. S. 590 (1934).
40. See supra, note 11.
41. See supra, note 12.
42. Although throughout this article the act is discussed as though it
prohibited discrimination with a buyer or his customers, regardless of
whether the buyer had knowledge of the discrimination or not, it should be
noted that subdivision (a) in express terms refers only to a buyer who
knowingly receives the benefits of such discrimination. As is pointed out
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Of course, it is undoubtedly true that all successful competi-
tion is necessarily the impairment of the competitive power of a
rival.43 It is vital to an understanding of this law to realize that
its purpose is not the blanket protection of competition as such.
It prohibits only the use of certain competitive weapons, upon
the theory that their unrestrained use leads to conditions which
are less desirable than the preservation of that degree of freedom
of competition which their employment involves. 44 In fact it may
be said that the act prohibits certain competitive practices be-
in 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106 (1936), at page 108, "A literal construction of the
Act yields the result that a discriminating seller, no matter how great the
injury to competitors of his purchaser, or of customers of his purchaser,
does not violate this section unless the purchaser knows that he is being
granted a discriminatory price. Difficulties of proving such knowledge are
as great as the ease with which its acquisition may be prevented." This
literal construction is so completely contrary to the patent intent of Con-
gress that there is grave doubt that it will be adopted. The intent which
the Act as a whole reveals in this respect was that actually held in Con-
gress. 80 Cong. Rec. 9410, Conference Report and Statement of the Mlanag-
ers for the House of Representatives. "The word 'knowingly' appears in the
Senate amendment immediately before the words 'receives the benefit of
such discrimination.' The House conferees accepted this amendment. Its
purpose is to exempt from the meaning of the surrounding clause those
who incidentally receive discriminatory prices in the routine course of busi-
ness without special solicitation, negotiation, or other arrangement for them
on the part of the buyer or seller and who are therefore not justly charge-
able with knowledge that they are receiving the benefit of such discrimina-
tion." It should be recalled that the Supreme Court, in reaching the con-
clusion that the Sherman Act prohibited only those monopolies which were
in unreasonable restraint of trade departed quite as much from the literal
terms of that act, to arrive at what it conceived to be the congressional
intent, as would be required to effect a similar result in this case.
Furthermore, in view of the cases under the Clayton Act holding that a
tendency to eliminate an individual competitor was a tendency to sub-
stantially lessen competition, see footnote 12, and in view of the fact that
such effect was illegal where it appeared in any line of commerce, see foot-
note 14, the scope of the act would not be seriously limited by the literal
interpretation noted above.
43. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 33 S. Ct. 66,
57 L. ed. 164 (1912), at page 160: "All competition, it is added, imports an
attempt to destroy or prevent the competition of rivals, and there is no
difference in principle between the prohibited act, and the ordinary efforts
of traders at a single place." See also Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197, 406, 24 S. Ct. 436, 48 L. ed. 679 (1903) ; and Whitwell
v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454, 64 L. R. A. 689 (C. C. A. 8, 1903).
44. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, supra, note 42, at page 160:
"If the legislature shares the now prevailing belief as to what is public
policy and finds that a particular instrument of trade war is being used
against that policy in certain cases, it may direct its law against what it
deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of
possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does
not differ in kind from those that are allowed."
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cause their effectiveness is so very great that their continued
existence ultimately leads to the negation of competition itself.4
It is thus recognized that the continuance of competition depends
upon the existence of a situation in which a continuous reciprocal
injury to competitive power can occur. Such a situation can
exist only where there are a sufficient number of competitors.
The law was enacted because it was thought that the practices
prohibited, by destroying competitors, would lead to the destruc-
tion of the conditions upon which competition depends.
This law is thus merely another step in the direction in which
all anti-trust legislation has moved. The Sherman Act was de-
signed to protect competition merely by prohibiting monopolies
generally. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act were intended to prevent certain practices which it was be-
lieved led to the growth of monopolies. By making the prohibi-
tions of the Clayton Act more specific, and by forbidding other
particular trade practices, the Robinson-Patman Act simply at-
tempts to catch practices with a monopolistic tendency at an
earlier stage in their development than previous legislation has
done.46
Since the concern of the law is not with discrimination per se,
but only with discrimination which results in an impairment of
competitive power, the illegality of the discrimination is made to
depend upon its effect within the field of competition. A fortiori
this would require the proscribed effect to flow from the discrimi-
natory quality of the relationship involved; that is, it would re-
quire the discrimination itself to be the proximate cause of the
effect upon competition. But such is not the rule to be drawn
from the act and from the cases. It is true that a discrimination
45. Donovan, Need for Revision of the Anti-Trust Laws (1936) 22 A. B.
A. Journal 797: "We have realized, however, that competition is not a self-
operating mechanical concept. We know that it may be carried to extremes.
That all competition is not good and that it may produce results dangerous
to economic society." Richberg, Need for Revision of the Anti-Trust Laws(1936) 22 A. B. A. Journal 804: "An unregulated system of competition
paradoxically produces at once the monopolistic seeds of its own destruc-
tion.... We can hardly question the conclusion that without some form of
anti-monopoly laws the eventual outcome of trade and industrial operations
in serving the major essential needs of a modern community would be the
concentration of control in organizations of such size and economic strength
that effective competition would become impossible to inaugurate or to
maintain."
46. See supra, notes 6, 7 and 20.
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is unlawful if, as a result of its character, there is an injury to
competition. But a discrimination is also illegal, even though the
injury is not the result of its discriminatory character, if the
injury is caused by either of the transactions which are involved
in the discrimination.
If the injury resulting from a discriminatory sale is to the
competitive power of one of the customers of the seller, then it
is clear that it is the discriminatory character of the relationship
that causes injury to competition. Thus if a manufacturer sells
the same commodity to different competing customers at prices
which discriminate against one, it is clear that the competitive
power of the less favored customer is injured; and it is equally
clear that the injury is the direct result of the discrimination in
price against him and in favor of his competitor.
However, if in this case, the two customers were not in com-
petition, there would be no injury to competition in respect to
them. Nevertheless the discrimination would be illegal if, as a
result of the cheaper price granted to the favored customer, a
competitor of the manufacturer were deprived of a customer,
since injury to competition with the manufacturer would then
result. The injury in this latter case, however, would result not
from the discriminatory character of the relationship between
the two sales, but would result from the price involved in only
one of the transactions. Thus the transaction here involved
would be illegal because the lower price deprived a competitor of
the manufacturer of a customer and because the price happened
-quite fortuitously-also to be discriminatory.
The latter situation is illustrated by the case of Porto Rican
American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.47 In that case,
the Porto Rican Company sought to enjoin the American Com-
pany from violating Section 2 of the Clayton Act. The two com-
panies were engaged in competition in the sale of their cigarettes
in Porto Rico. The American company inaugurated a price war
by selling its cigarettes at less than cost in Porto Rico. As an
incidental result, purchasers of the American company's cigar-
ettes in the United States were required to pay much higher
prices than its purchasers in Porto Rico. Thus there was dis-
47. 30 F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 2, 1929), cert. den., 279 U. S. 858, 49 S. Ct.
353, 73 L. ed. 999 (1929).
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crimination in respect to these two classes of purchasers. The
court, in affirming a decree in favor of the plaintiff, said, "This
(price cutting) establishes an unjust discrimination made be-
tween customers.... If this competition, resulting in such loss,
continued, it is fair to assume that the appellee could not con-
tinue in business, and its elimination as a competitor was certain.
Thus the appellant's discrimination will substantially lessen com-
petition. ' 4 8
In the foregoing case, it was not the discrimination which
tended to lessen competition in cigarettes in Porto Rico, it was
the price cutting by the American company. The fact that this
price cutting resulted also in discrimination was purely adven-
titious, as regards the lessening of competition. However it was
the discriminatory character of the price cutting sales which
brought them within the ambit of Section 2 of the Clayton Act,
since that act did not directly prohibit price cutting.49 If the
American Tobacco Company had been selling cigarettes in Porto
Rico alone, there would have been no discrimination, hence no
violation of law, and no illegality regardless of the price cutting.
Thus the always difficult question of legal causation is further
complicated by the variety of its possible aspects under this law.
III
Functional discounts appear to be permissible under this law
by virtue of the fact that price differentials which do not injure
competition are lawful, as well as by the provision that the seller
may reflect in the price, due allowance for differences in cost
arising from various methods of sale. Thus a price variance be-
tween two purchasers may be legal if one of them is a whole-
saler and the other a retailer either because there is no injury
to competition,", or because the cost of selling to the wholesaler
48. At page 237.
49. However price cutting as a weapon for the achievement of monopoly
has been condemned in cases arising under the Sherman Act. Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. ed. 619 (1911);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632, 55
L. ed. 663 (1911). Such price cutting for the purpose of eliminating a
competitor is specifically prohibited by Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act. See infra, note 93.
50. Thus in S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d)
415 (C. C. A. 6, 1925), the court held that selling spark plugs to an auto-
mobile manufacturer at a cheaper price than such goods were sold to re-
tailers was not a discrimination in violation of the Clayton Act since it
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is less as a result of'the performance by the wholesaler of func-
tions, such as warehousing, not performed by the retailer."
However, three possible situations must be distinguished. First,
where there is no competition between the wholesaler or any of
his customers and the retailer, there can be no lessening of com-
petition, and so a discrimination will not be illegal in any event.
Second, where there is competition between the customers of the
wholesaler and the retailer, the discrimination will be illegal
only if it is so great as to give an unfair competitive advantage
to the competitor of the retailer who purchases from the whole-
saler. It should also be noted that since injury to competition is
an element of the offense, and therefore must be established by
the plaintiff, the burden of showing that an alleged functional
discount is not a true one, and so injures competition, will be
upon the plaintiff, in these two situations. The third possible
situation is that where the discount allowed to the wholesaler
merely reflects a reasonable allowance for functions actually per-
formed which effect a saving to the seller, in which case the dis-
count is lawful regardless of its effect upon competition. Conse-
quently, it may be said that differentiations between buyers who
perform different functions in the distributive scheme will ordi-
narily be lawful because not injuring competition, and in every
case they can be justified where they merely reflect the saving
to the seller resulting from the functions performed by the
buyers.
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that a plaintiff, in a
civil suit for injunction or treble damages for violation of sub-
division (a) of Section 1 of the Act, will establish a prima facie
case by showing:
1) That there has been a discrimination between purchasers
in sales of commodities of like grade and quality;
2) That one of the sales was in interstate commerce, and the
goods were not intended for export; and,
did not tend to lessen competition. Similarly in Baran v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (D. C. N. Y., 1919) the plaintiffs brought an
action at law charging that the defendants violated the Clayton Act by
discriminating in price between manufacturers of automobiles and dealers
in the sale of supplies. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint,
saying, at page 574: "There is apparently no competition between the manu-
facturers of tires and the dealers, nor is it alleged that any exists. The
differentiation in price -would not therefore substantially lessen competition."




3) That the discrimination, or one of the sales, resulted in in-
jury to competition with the seller, the purchaser, or the cus-
tomers of either, or in a tendency to monopoly. With this much
established, the person charged with violation of the law can
escape liability only by establishing one of the defenses allowed
by the law, or by disproving the plaintiff's case. The burden of
proving the existence of such justifying circumstances is upon
the party seeking to take advantage of them.
IV
The most important affirmative defense under this law is con-
tained in the provision that permits differentials in price which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities of sale. This does not require a seller to reflect in the
price all the savings resulting to him from the particular circum-
stances of each sale,r2 although it allows him to do so. In this
provision Congress has adopted the very reasonable interpreta-
tion put upon the Clayton Act by the Federal Trade Commission,
that quantity discounts must bear some reasonable relationship
to the differences in cost resulting from the varying quantities
of the sales. 53 This proviso enables one charged with violation of
52. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1936) 5; H. R. Rep. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1936) 6.
53. See supra, note 10. The question of the extent of the differentials
which are permissible under this provision will ordinarily be one of fact.
It was not the intent of Congress that this provision should justify a seller
in relieving any purchaser from a share of the general overhead. Sen.
Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) 6. "It [this provision] is de-
signed, in short, to leave the test of a permissible differential upon the
question; If the more favored customer were sold in the same quantities
and by the same methods of sale and delivery as the customer not so fav-
ored, how much more per unit would it actually cost the seller to do so,
his other business remaining the same?" See also H. R. Rep. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936). The foregoing construction would appear to
be too broad. Since the question of what constitutes a due allowance for
difference in cost is one of fact its solution will probably be arrived at by
the application of proper accounting methods to the facts of each case.
Consequently the effect of this provision seems to be that attributed to it
by Mr. Utterback, one of the House Managers, who said, "It is through this
clause that the bill assures to the mass distributor, as to everyone else,
full protection in the use and rewards of efficient methods in production and
distribution in return for depriving him of the right to crush his efficient
smaller competitors with the power and resources of mere size. There is no
limit to the phases of production, sale, and distribution in which such im-
provements may be devised and the economies, when demonstrated, may be
expressed in price differentials in favor of the particular customers whose
distinctive methods of purchase and delivery make them possible. They
apply ... as between purchasers in equal quantities, for example, where
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the law to justify discriminatory sales not only by showing that
the differential allowed was the result of a proper quantity dis-
count, but also that it reflected any saving to the seller resulting
from other factors in the sale.
Also under the present law the Federal Trade Commission is
authorized to establish quantity limits for each commodity, be-
yond which due allowances for savings resulting from the quan-
tity of sales will not be permitted. Such quantity limits may be
established only after a hearing to all interested parties, and a
finding that differentials resulting from savings, through sales
of quantities beyond such limits, would be "unjustly discrimina-
tory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce," because
the prospective purchasers beyond such quantities are so few ."
This provision is not operative until action has been taken by
the Commission; and by its own terms, the effect of this provi-
sion will be limited to a few large purchasers.
The several provisions of subdivision (a) of Section 1 of this
law also allow one charged with violation of it to justify the
discrimination by showing that it resulted from the selection in
good faith of customers, or that it resulted from a price change
made to meet changing market conditions. The right to select
customers, where exercised in good faith, also existed under the
former law,5 and it was held under it that this right allowed a
one takes multiple store-delivery, and the other single warehouse delivery,
with consequent savings in trucking or other delivery costs to the seller,
that saving may be expressed in a price differential.
"Or where one customer orders from hand to mouth during the rush of
the season, compelling the employment of more expensive overtime labor
in order to fill his orders; while another orders far in advance, permitting
the manufacturer to use cheaper off-season labor, with the elimination of
overtime, or perhaps to buy his raw materials at cheapter off-season prices,
.... So also where a manufacturer or merchant sells to some customer
through traveling-salesman solicitation, to others across the counter, and
to others by mail order from catalog, price differentials may be made to
reflect the differing costs of such varying methods of sale."
54. The constitutionality of this provision has been seriously questioned
upon the ground that it constitutes an improper delegation of legislative
power. Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act (1936) 22 A.
B. A. Journal 593, 596; 50 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 111 (1936) as well as upon
the ground that it exceeds the commerce power. Robertson, The Robinson-
Patman Act (Nov., 1936) 14 Fortune Mag. 96, 166.
55. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co., (1922) 257
U. S. 419, 42 S. Ct. 159, 66 L. ed. 299 (1922); United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U. S. 300, 39 S. Ct. 465, 63 L. ed. 992 (1919); Great A. & P. Tea
Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2, 1915) ; Green v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., 24 F. (2d) 378 (C. C. A. 2, 1928), cert. den., 278
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seller to refuse to grant a co-operative association of retailers
the same discount that he did a single wholesaler, although the
terms of both sales and the quantities sold were substantially
identical in the two cases. Thus in Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission,6 the Mennen Company was charged with price dis-
crimination in violation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act because
it refused to allow the same discount to co-operative associations
of retailers that it granted to individual wholesalers, although
the conditions under which the two purchasers bought were
identical.
The court disposed of that branch of the case by holding that
Section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibited only discrimination
which tended to monopoly, or which injured competition with
the seller, and that there was no showing of either effect in the
case before it. However, the court then proceeded to a discussion
of the right to select customers as a justification of discrimina-
tion resulting from functional discounts. Reasoning on the
analogy of those cases which hold that the mere refusal to sell
to a purchaser who fails to maintain prices is not a violation of
the Sherman Act,57 the court announced that a similar right to
select customers existed under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, and
that since the right to refuse to sell at all existed, it followed
that the seller could refuse to sell save on such terms as he might
choose. If he chose to treat one purchaser as a retailer and an-
other as a wholesaler, and vary the discounts allowed to each
accordingly, that was his privilege, and nothing could be done
about it under the Clayton Act.e8 Of course the next step in such
U. S. 602, 49 S. Ct. 9, 73 L. ed. 530 (1928). In the Cream of Wheat case,
supra, it was said, at page 48-9: "We had supposed that it was elementary
law that a trader could buy from whom he pleased and sell to whom he
pleased, and that his selection of seller and buyer was wholly his own con-
cern ... Before the Sherman Act it was the law that a trader might re-ject the offer of a proposing buyer, for any reason that appealed to him;
it might be because he did not like the other's business methods, or be-
cause he had some personal difference with him, political, racial, or social.
That was purely his own affair, with which nobody else had any concern.
Neither the Sherman Act, nor any decision of the Supreme Court constru-
ing the same, nor the Clayton Act, has changed the law in this particular.
We have not yet reached the stage where the selection of a trader's cus-
tomers is made for him by the government."
56. 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2, 1923) cert. den., 262 U. S. 759, 43 S. Ct.
705, 67 L. ed. 1219 (1923).
57. Federal Trade Com'n v. Beech Nut Packing Co., and United States v.
Colgate & Co., supra, note 55.
58. Mennen case, supra, note 56. at page 780.
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reasoning is that the right to refuse to sell permits a vendor to
refuse to sell except in a discriminatory manner. The result of
this "logic" obviously is a nullification of this whole law by the
right to select customers.P
In National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission' the
right of a seller to grant a discount to a chain store where a
similar discount was not allowed to a co-operative association of
retailers, although the two sales were in other respects identical,
was sustained by the court upon the ground that neither a sub-
stantial lessening of competition nor a tendency to monopoly
resulted. It was held, following the Mennen case (supra), that
Section 2 of the Clayton Act did not protect competition with
purchasers of the discriminatory seller. The allowance of the
functional discount by the National Biscuit Company to the
wholesaler, and its refusal to the co-operative association of re-
tailers was approved by the court. If it can be said that the hold-
ing in the above cases is limited to the rule that Section 2 of the
Clayton Act did not protect competition with the purchasers
from a discriminating seller, they have been overruled by the
Supreme Court and merit no further attention.1 However, it is
possible that they will be invoked to support the position that
the right to select customers, which is granted by the Robinson-
Patman Act, carries with it the right to grant functional dis-
counts regardless of the effect. It has been noted above that such
a rule can be arrived at only by a process of arid deduction to
which legal propositions will not submit, and that its establish-
ment would result in the complete emasculation of the statute.
Consequently it may be concluded that the right to refuse to sell
will not justify a discrimanatory seller in selling upon whatever
terms he chooses.62
59. Cf. McAllister, Sales Policies and Price Discrimination Under the
Clayton Act (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 518.
60. 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2, 1924), cert. den., 266 U. S. 613, 45 S. Ct.
95, 69 L. ed. 468 (1924).
61. See note 14.
62. That this conclusion is correct, and that the reasoning of the courts
in the Mennen and National Biscuit Co. cases is fallacious in this regard,
is shown by the cases under the Sherman Act holding that the right to
refuse to sell includes only the right to refuse to treat, and does not include
the right to refuse to sell except upon terms violative of the Act. Eastman
Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U. S. 359, 47 S. Ct. 400, 71 L. ed. 684(1927); United States v. A. Schrader's Son Inc., 252 U. S. 85, 40 S. Ct. 251,
64 L. ed. 471 (1920); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U. S. 873, 31 S. Ct. 376, 55 L. ed. 502 (1911).
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Another defense to a price change otherwise discriminatory is
that such a change was made in response to changing marketing
conditions. It should be noted that this defense is available only
where it is alleged that the discrimination results from price
changes from time to time. It is of no avail in a case where the
discrimination results from varying prices to competing pur-
chasers at the same time. Of course it is clear that a discrimina-
tion could very well result from a rapid variance in prices during
a relatively short period. Consequently unless the justification
that such changes were made to meet marketing conditions can
be established, a seller can change his prices from time to time
only after giving adequate notice to the trade in general that
such change will be made.
An interesting question arises as to whether or not the Act
prohibits the making of long-term contracts for sale at a given
price, in a case where sales pursuant to the contract are made
at a lower price than subsequent sales which in other respects
are identical. In such a case even though the lower price of the
contract sales could not be justified upon one of the grounds
mentioned above, it seems clear that sales made under it would
not be illegal in respect to subsequent sales if, at the time the
contract was made, the contract itself was not discriminatory.
In other words, if the seller under such a contract, at the time
it was entered into, made available to competitors of the pur-
chaser under the contract similar amounts of the commodity on
similar terms as those contained in the contract, the contract it-
self would not be discriminatory, and consequently subsequent
sales made under it would not be illegal.
V
In considering the effect of the act upon existing contracts to
sell, a very nice problem is presented. Cases under both the Clay-
ton and the Sherman Act hold that Congress has the power to
invalidate pre-existing contracts in conflict with their provi-
sions.63 Therefore if sales made under pre-existing contracts are
63. Elliott Mach. Co. v. Center, 227 Fed. 124 (D. C. Mich., 1915) ; United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 227 Fed. 509 (D. C. Mo. 1915); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 235 Fed. 398 (C. C. A. 2, 1916),
aff'd 243 U. S. 502, 37 S. Ct. 416, 61 L. ed. 871 (1917); United States v.
Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214, 42 S. Ct. 496, 66 L. ed. 907 (1922) ; cf.,
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 S. Ct. 265, 55 L. ed.
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discriminatory in respect to other sales now being made, and
one of the prohibited effects follows, it would seem that the con-
tracts would be invalidated by the new Act, and the sales made
pursuant thereto would be declared illegal. However if the rea-
soning above is correct, sales made pursuant to long term con-
tracts are not discriminatory if the contracts as a whole are not
discriminatory at the time of their formation. From this it fol-
lows that sales made under contracts antedating the Act are not
illegal unless the contracts themselves were discriminatory at the
time of their consummation. But by what standard shall such
discrimination be judged, the standard then existing, or the
standard now established? In view of the decisions under the
other anti-trust laws it is probable that the standard set up by
the new law will be applied even to pre-existing contracts. 4
VI
One of the most keenly mooted questions arising under the
law is whether or not it prohibits the basing point method of
pricing. The "basing point system"' 5 is used to describe that
297 (1911); New York Central R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 500, 29
S. Ct. 309, 53 L. ed. 624 (1909); contra, United States v. United Shoo
Mach. Co., 264 Fed. 138 (D. C. Mo., 1920).
64. In Louisville & N. R. R. v. Mottley, supra, note 63, the court says at
pages 474, 478, and 485, "In our consideration of the case it will be assumed
-indeed the parties themselves assume-that the agreement of 1871 was
not when made in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United
States. But we must first inquire whether such an agreement, if made after
the passage of the original and amendatory commerce acts, would have been
valid under those acts. If those acts forbid agreements of that character
we must then inquire whether the one in suit can now be enforced simply
because it was valid when made. . . . Manifestly, from the face of the
commerce act itself, Congress, before taking final action, considered the
question as to what exceptions, if any, should be made in respect of the
prohibition of free tickets, free passes and free transportation. It solved
the question when, without making any exceptions of existing contraots,
it forbade by broad, explicit words any carrier to charge, demand, collect
or receive a 'greater or less or different compensation' for any services. ...
We forebear any further citation of authorities. They are numerous and
all one way. They support the view that, as the contract in question would
have been illegal if made after the passage of the commerce act, it can-
not now be enforced against the railroad company, even though valid when
made. If that principle be not sound, the result would be that individuals
and corporations could, by contracts between themselves, in anticipation of
legislation, render of no avail the exercise by Congress to the full extent
authorized by the Constitution, of its power to regulate commerce. No
power of Congress can be thus restricted."
65. For a general discussion of price systems, including the basing-point
system, see Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Price Bases In-
quiry,-The Basing-Point Formula and Cement Prices (March, 1932).
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method of pricing wherein prices for a given commodity are
quoted f. o. b. a certain point, and the final charge made for the
commodity is that f. o. b. price plus the freight from the f. o. b.
point to the place of delivery, regardless of the point from which
the commodity is shipped. For example, under this system a
fabricator of steel in St. Louis is required to pay for steel deliv-
ered to him at a price composed of the Pittsburgh f. o. b. price
plus the cost of transporting the steel from Pittsburgh to St.
Louis, although in fact the steel may have been smeltered in St.
Louis. This system of pricing seems clearly discriminatory as
there is certainly a differential, not justified by cost to the seller,
operating against purchasers requiring delivery at points dis-
tant from the basing point 6 If a sale in which this cost plus
method of price quotation is used results in one of the four pro-
hibited effects, it would almost certainly be unlawful under this
act.6
7
On the other hand, it seems reasonably clear that this law
does not forbid that system of pricing wherein goods are sold
at a uniform delivered price, regardless of point of delivery,
merely because in such a case more of the cost of transportation
66. This conclusion is contrary to that reached by other commentators.
50 Harv. L. Rev. 106 (1936) ; see also 45 Harv. L. Rev. 548 (1932) ; Gordon,
Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act (1936) 22 A. B. A. Journal 593,
594; Robertson, Robinson-Patman Act (Nov., 1936) 14 Fortune Mag. 96,
162. These views are based on the fact that a provision defining price as
"the amount received by the vendor after deducting actual freight or other
cost of transportation, if any, allowed or defrayed by the vendor" was
stricken from the bill in conference. 80 Cong. Rec. 8434, 8439. This provi-
sion was broad enough to forbid the uniform delivered price system, as
well as the basing point system. Agreement to the elimination of this pro-
vision was secured because of a desire to allow the uniform delivered price
system (1936) 80 Cong. Rec. 8327 et seq., and because of the fact that a
separate bill was pending which was specifically directed against the basing
point system. 80 Cong. Rec. 8434; Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 4055 (Mar. 9 to
Apr. 10, 1936) 2. However these considerations cannot prevail against the
plain language of the act. Van Camp & Sons v. American Can. Co., foot-
note 14, supra; see Standard Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., footnote 7, supra,
at page 356.
67. The basing point system was held illegal even under the former act,
Re U. S. Steel Corp., 8 F. T. C. 58 (Dec. 1, 1924). This proceeding lasted
four years, and resulted in a record of twenty million words. Respondents
agreed to comply with the order rather than contest it, although without
admitting its validity. Since the termination of this proceeding the use of
the basing point system has spread widely and rapidly. Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., on
S. 4055, (Mar. 9 to Apr. 10, 1936) 4. There have been no other proceed-
ings, attacking this system under Section 2 of the Clayton Act.
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is paid by the purchaser nearer the point of shipment than is
necessary to pay the cost of transportation to himself. Uniform
delivered prices are not unlawful under this Act because the Act
does not require that the price charged be merely the cost to the
seller plus a reasonable profit; it merely requires that no un-
justified, or discriminatory, price differentials be charged. Vary-
ing costs may justify differences in prices; but varying costs do
not require differences in prices.(;
VII
Subdivision (b) of Section 169 refers to proceedings brought
before the Federal Trade Commission. It contains two principal
provisions: the first that after proof of discrimination in price,
the respondent has the burden of rebutting the prima facie case
thus made; and second, that in rebutting such a prima facie case,
the seller may show tfhat the discriminatory price was made in
good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor. Little
difficulty arises as to the first provision. The rule there stated,
that matters of justification are affirmative defenses upon which
the defendant bears the burden of proof, follows from the deci-
sions under the Clayton Act 7 0 as well as from familiar principles
of jurisprudence. 'The need, if any, for that provision arises
from the fact that proceedings before the Commission, being ad-
ministrative in their nature rather than judicial, are not gov-
erned by the technical requirements of court procedure.71
68. See supra, note 52.
69. Subdivision (b) of Section 1 reads as follows:
"(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under
this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or
facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus
made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged -with a
violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the
discrimination: P'rovided, however, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by
showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facili-
ties to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities fur-
nished by a competitor."
70. See supra, notes 15 and 16.
71. Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission,
18 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 8, 1927), cert. den., 275 U. S. 533, 48 S. Ct. 30,
72 L. ed. 411 (1927); John Bene & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission,
299 Fed. 466 (C. C. A. 2, 1924); see Hills Bros. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 9 F. (2d) 481, 484 (C. C. A. 9, 1926) ; cf. Spiller v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry., 253 U. S. 117, 126, 40 S. Ct. 466, 64 L. ed. 810 (1920). In
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At least two problems arise in connection with the second pro-
vision. In the first place, in its terms it is limited to proceedings
brought against a seller, although it is clear that proceedings
may be maintained against not only a seller but also against a
buyer, or anyone who knowingly induces or receives a discrimi-
nation in price: 2 Will this provision apply in such a case? In
the second place, by the literal terms of this provision it applies
only to proceedings before the Commission; and it may be argued
that since this is the only express provision in the Act which
allows a meeting of competition as a justification, and since the
former law expressly allowed this defense in all cases whether
civil suits for damages or proceedings before the Commission,
the omission was intentional, and the defense does not now exist
in the case of a civil suit for damages or an injunction.
However, it is believed that this defense is available in a civil
suit for damages or injunction, as well as in commission proceed-
ings against a buyer. An interpretation of the Act denying this
right would cast doubt upon its constitutionality, 73 and it is of
course a well-established canon of construction that an act will
not be construed in such a way as to make it invalid if it is rea-
sonably susceptible of any other construction.-3 Further, it
John Bene & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, supra, it is said, at page
471: "The questions suggested by the foregoing references are whether
the Commission, in its investigations, is restricted to the taking of legally
competent and relevant testimony. We incline to think that it is not by
the statute, and, having regard to the exigencies of administrative law,
that it should not be so restricted. We are of the opinion that evidence or
testimony, even though legally incompetent, if of the kind that usually
affects fair-minded men in the conduct of their daily and more important
affairs, should be received and considered; but it should be fairly done.
The Trade Commission, like many other modern administrative legal ex-
periments, is called upon simultaneously to enact the roles of complainant,jury, judge, and counsel."
It was recognized by the sponsors of this law that the provision above
referred to was merely a statement of existing law. 80 Cong. Rec. 8442(1936) ; see also 80 Cong. Rec. 8452, 8331 (1936).
72. See infra, notes 82 and 83.
73. Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 506,
71 L. ed. 893 (1921) ; but see Butterick Co. v. Fed. Trade Commission, 4 F.(2d) 910 (C. C. A. 2, 1925); cf. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226
U. S. 157, 33 S. Ct. 76, 57 L. ed. 156 (1912).
73a. In Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S.
298, 44 S. Ct. 336, 68 L. ed. 696, 32 A. L. R. 786 (1924), at page 307, Mr.
Justice Holmes says, "We cannot attribute to Congress an intent to defy
the Fourth Amendment or even to come so near to doing so as to raise a
serious question of constitutional law. United States v. Delaware & Hudson
Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401."
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seems to have been the intent of Congress that such a defense
should be available to all actions instituted under the law.7d The
chief congressional concern was that the defense should not be
allowed to justify the undercutting of the competitor's price.7
VIII
Largely because of the Federal Trade Commission's report on
chain stores76 the feeling was widespread in Congress at the
time of the enactment of this law that certain trade practices
such as the granting fake brokerage fees7 7 and fictitious advertis-
ing allowances were so prevalent and so detrimental to compe-
tition that they should be dealt with specifically. Consequently
Subdivision (c) 78 of Section 1 prohibits the payment of brokerage
fees by one party to a sale to the other party or anyone under
the control of the other party, regardless of the effect of such
74. See H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1936), 80 Cong.
Rec. 8439, 8440, 8446 (1936); cf. 80 Cong. Ree. 9560 and 1017 (1936).
But cf. 80 Cong. Rec. 9410-9411 (1936).
75. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1936), 80 Cong. Rec.
8446 (1936). It was said that the defense of meeting competition was not
available where the competition to be met was itself illegal under this law.
80 Cong. Rec. 9560 (1936). The language of the law allowing this defense
does not so limit it. (Supra, note 69). The difficulties in the way of a
seller ascertaining whether or not the price of his competitor is an unlaw-
fully discriminatory one are so great that they could seldom if ever be
overcome. Further the essence of this defense is that the person seeking
to rely upon it meets competition in good faith, and this subjective element
in the defense is entirely independent of the legality of the competition
which it was sought to meet. Consequently there seems to be no reason for
believing that the use of the defense is limited to cases where the competi-
tion which is met is lawful. The existence and the precise scope of this
defense under the Robinson-Patman Act, are shrouded in doubt, but it is
believed that the view taken herein is the one that will be taken by the
courts in the application of this law.
76. See supra, note 21.
77. For an example of the manner in which this practice is employed,
See Trunz Pork Stores v. Wallace, 70 F. (2d) 688 (C. C. A. 2, 1934). See
also in this connection, Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on Chain
Store Investigation, supra, note 21, p. 161 and 162.
78. Subdivision (c) of Section 1 of the Act reads as follows:
"(c) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive
or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other
compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for
services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction
or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where
such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to
the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other
than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid."
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payment, if the sale is in the course of commerce and the fee is
not a reasonable one for services actually rendered in connec-
tion with the sale. It should be noted that the accepting as well
as the granting of such payments is prohibited, and that they
are prohibited regardless of whether or not they are discrimina-
tory.
By Subdivision (d) ,7 payment to a customer for promotional
or other facilities or services is unlawful unless similar payments
are available to competitors of such customers on "proportion-
ately equal terms." Subdivision (e) 10 makes it illegal for a seller
to discriminate between purchasers by furnishing facilities or
services to one without making such facilities or services avail-
able upon "proportionately equal terms" to all. This last proviso
requires such services and facilities to be available to all pur-
chasers, regardless of whether or not they are engaged in com-
petition with the customers to whom the original concession was
granted. It is possible, however, that there could be no discrimi-
nation unless all the customers were engaged in competition with
each other.
The most serious question which these last two provisions
raise is as to the meaning of the phrase "proportionately equal
terms." The equality referred to can be determined only in ac-
cordance with the relative values of services or facilities. The
value can be either that to the seller or the value to the purchaser.
The general tenor of the law would indicate that the value of
such service or facilities to the purchaser should be determina-
79. Subdivision (d) of Section 1 of the Act reads as follows:
"(d) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value or to
for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such
commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or
facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with
the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or
commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person,
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally
equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of
such products or commodities."
80. Subdivision (e) of Section 1 of the Act reads as follows:
"(e) That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor
of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a com-
modity bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting
to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any
services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or
offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not ac-
corded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms."
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tive of the question, since its primary concern is the prohibi-
tion of discrimination between purchasers, and if the relative
value to the purchasers were equal, there would be no discrimi-
nation. On the other hand, since these prohibitions of specific
trade practices were enacted to eliminate evasive methods of
discrimination, it may be urged with great force that the test of
equality should be the value to the seller, since if such an allow-
ance merely reflects the value to him, it would be granted in
good faith and thus not be within the purview of these provi-
sions. The question cannot be definitely answered by construc-
tion of the Act, but if the standard is taken to be the value to
the seller, the evils against which the Act is directed could be
avoided and legitimate merchandising devices preserved. In light
of this patent ambiguity on the face of the Act, resort may be
had to proper legislative sources 8o and these sustain the view
that the equality of the services or facilities granted must de-
pend upon their value to the seller under the circumstances.81
IX
The last part of section 1 is subdivision (f) ,82 which makes it
unlawful "for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination
in price which is prohibited by this section." It is clearly both
the intent and effect of this section to make the one who receives
80a. See Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. ed.
349 (1921), at page 474: "By repeated decisions of this court it has come
to be well established that the debates in Congress expressive of the views
and motives of individual members are not a safe guide, and hence may not
be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the law-making
body. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24; United States v. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 71, 79; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso-
ciation, 166 U. S. 290, 318. But reports of committees of House or Senate
stand upon a more solid footing, and may be regarded as an exposition
of the legislative intent in a case where otherwise the meaning of a statute
is obscure. Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 495. And this has been
extended to include explanatory statements in the nature of a supplemental
report made by the committee member in charge of a bill in the course of
passage. Binns v. United States, supra; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Inter-
national Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184, 198-199; United States v. Coca Cola Co.,
241 U. S. 265, 281; United States v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry.
Co., 247 U. S. 310, 318."
81. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) 8; H. R. Rep. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) 16.
82. Subdivision (f) of Section 1 of the Act reads as follows:
"(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or re-
ceive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
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a discrimination equally guilty with the one who grants it. How-
ever, suppose a buyer, engaged only in intrastate commerce, in-
duces and receives a discrimination in price from a seller en-
gaged also in interstate commerce. The seller is liable to an in-
jured interstate buyer for violation of Subdivision (a). But only
Subdivision (f) applies to the buyer, and that prohibits only the
receiving of a discrimination by a person engaged in "commerce"
-which, of course, means interstate commerce. 3 The conclusion
appears inevitable that a buyer engaged purely in intrastate com-
merce who induces or receives a discrimination from a seller who
is within the ambit of the act does not violate Section 1 of the
Act, although a buyer in interstate commerce who did the same
thing would clearly incure liability.
Since Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act is to be read as
though it had been enacted originally as Section 2 of the Clay-
ton Act, the provisions for enforcement of the Clayton Act are
applicable to Section 1 of this Act. Thus the methods by which
enforcement of Section 1 may be secured are: (1) proceedings
before the Federal Trade Commission;"4 (2) an injunction suit
brought by the federal district attorney; 5 (3) an injunction suit
brought by an aggrieved private party;86 and (4) a civil suit
for treble damages brought by an aggrieved private party.87 Pro-
ceedings and jurisdiction will be the same under this law as
under the Clayton Act. A civil suit under the anti-trust laws
may be brought by any one who has been injured as a result of
an unlawful act, and it is not necessary that the plaintiff be one
who is specifically mentioned in the law, nor be one who has been
directly discriminated against by the acts complained of.s8 These
rules remain the same under the new as under the former law.
83. Lipson v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 76 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 1, 1935);
38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 12; and supra, note 24.
84. 43 Stat. 939, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 21 (1925).
85. 38 Stat. 736, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 25 (1914).
86. 38 Stat. 737, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 26 (1914).
87. 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 15 (1914).
88. Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 27 S. Ct. 65, 51
L. ed. 241 (1906), in which it was held that the plaintiff could recover
damages for high prices which he was forced to pay as a result of de-
fendants' unlawful combination in restraint of trade. However to entitle
a plaintiff to recover, he must have been personally damaged, Carbonic Gas
Co. v. Pure Carbonic Co., 4 F. Supp. 992 (D. C. N. Y., 1933); Ebeling v.
Foster & Kleiser Co., 12 F. Supp. 489 (D. C. Wash., 1935), and such damage
must be the direct and proximate result of the unlawful act. Peterson v.
Borden Co., 50 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 7, 1931). Cf. supra, note 47 and text
thereto.
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X
The Robinson-Patman Act suffers chiefly from a plethora of
provisions. In its final form it represents the union of two laws,
each designed to cover the whole field. The first section, which
imposes only civil liability, was originally the Robinson-Patman
bill,89 while the third section, which imposes only criminal lia-
bility, was originally the Borah-Van Nuys bill.90 This latter sec-
tion is not, as might be expected, merely a provision for the im-
position of criminal penalties for the wilful violation of what is
essentially a civil law; but it is an entirely different piece of
legislation which sets up its own test of unlawful conduct.91 How-
ever it is believed that its scope, with one exception, is no greater
than that of the first section ;92 and in some respects it is undoubt-
edly narrower. Since this provision is not technically a part of
the Clayton Act, there can be no civil liability for its violation,
in any event; and the only method by which it may be enforced
is by a criminal action for the imposition of the penalties therein
provided.
The first part of Section 393 prohibits participation, by anyone
engaged in commerce, in a sale which discriminates, to his knowl-
edge, against competitors of the purchaser in that any discount
rebate, or allowance is granted to the purchaser when no similar
89. This section had its genesis in a bill introduced in the House by
Mr. Patman as H. R. 8442; a companion bill was introduced into the Senate
by Mr. Robinson as S. 3154.
90. Mr. Van Nuys introduced a bill as S. 3835 on January 16, 1936; and
Mr. Borah introduced a similar bill as S. 3670 on January 16, 1936. On
February 24, 1936, Mr. Borah and Mr. Van Nuys jointly introduced a bill
as S. 4171 to supersede their previous separate bills. Hearings Before a
Senate Subcommittee of the Committde on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2nd
Sess., on S. 4171, (Mar. 24 & 25, 1936) pps. 1-3.
91. This section is taken almost verbatim from the Canadian Price Dis-
crimination Act. Canadian Stat. 25 & 26, Geo. V, c. 56, s. 9 (1935).
92. See 80 Cong. Rec. 9411, 9561 (1936).
93. Section 3 of the acts reads as follows:
"Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any
transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his
knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount,
rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to the pur-
chaser over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising
service charge available at the time of such transaction to said com-
petitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quan-
tity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United States
at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the
United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminat-
ing a competitor in such part of the United States, or, to sell, or con-
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allowance is available at that time to his competitors, in respect
of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity. This pro-
vision clearly requires the same elements to render a discrimi-
nation unlawful as does Section 1 of the Act.94 Thus the trans-
action must be in commerce, the goods must be of like grade and
quality, and since the discrimination must, under Section 3, be
against a competitor of the purchaser, there must certainly be
a tendency to injure competition. Similarly the justifications
that are available to a defendant under Section 1 are available
under this provision of Section 3. This provision does not pro-
hibit price discrimination which is the result of varying prices
in sales transacted at different times. The question of the amount
of time that must elapse between price changes, in order to take
them outside of the scope of this provision, will, of course, de-
pend upon the facts of each particular case; but since this provi-
sion does not prevent price changes from time to time, discrimi-
nation resulting from price changes made to meet changing
market conditions is not illegal under it. Nor does it prevent the
granting of functional discounts, since in such a case there would
be no discrimination between competitors. 5 Similarly this pro-
visions does not prevent a seller from reflecting in the price sav-
ings resulting from the particular conditions surrounding a sale,
since such a price differential would not be unfair, and hence not
discriminatory9G While it is not altogether free from doubt, it
would seem that the same considerations, which it was indicated
above would lead the court to allow the defense of meeting com-
petition under Section 1,97 would apply with even greater force
to Section 3.98 Although there is also some doubt as to whether or
tract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both."
94. For the elements of an offense, and justifications, under Section 1
see footnote 26 and text following.
95. For a discussion of functional discounts see text following footnote
50. The question of what constitutes a true functional discount under Sec-
tion 3 is the same as the question arising under Section 1.
96. See supra, note 37 and the discussion thereto.
97. See supra, notes 73 and 74, and text thereto.
98. Fairmont Co. v. Minnesota, supra, note 73. The state anti-price dis-
crimination statute held unconstitutional in that case because it did not
allow the meeting of competition as a defense, was more nearly similar to
Section 3 of this act than it was to Section 1, as it prohibited discrimination
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not this provision prohibits a seller from selecting customers in
good faith, the better view would appear to be that the seller is
not deprived of this right by this provision. It merely requires
that no discrimination be made against competitors of a pur-
chaser "in respect to a sale of goods . .. " It would seem to fol-
low from the language of this provision that it does not place
a common carrier burden upon the seller by requiring him to deal
with every available and qualified purchaser, but that it merely
requires a seller who does in fact deal with competitors to grant
the same terms to all competitors among his customers at a par-
ticular time.99 Furthermore, since this section imposes a crimi-
nal liability, it will be strictly construed; and all the constituent
elements of the offense, including knowledge of the discrimina-
tory character of the sale, must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Consequently there is little reason to believe that these
provisions will be more rigorous in their application than Sec-
tion 1.
However, in two short, but potentially important, provisions
at the end, Section 3 does go beyond Section 1. These provisions
prohibit selling goods at a lower price in one part of the country
than that exacted by the seller elsewhere within the country, and
selling goods "at unreasonably low prices," for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.10 It is clear
that all of the defenses available to a charge of discrimination
under Section 1 are available to a charge of price cutting under
these provisions. Thus the defense that the price was made in
response to changing market conditions, that it was merely the
per se, as does Section 3, and not merely discrimination tending to injure
competition, as does Section 1. The sponsors of this section thought that
it allowed the meeting of competition as a defense. 80 Cong. Rec. 10017(1936).
99. This conclusion is not rested solely upon any inherent right to re-
fuse to sell, see footnotes 55 and 62, supra, but is based rather upon the
view that by the language of this section, it is inapplicable to cases where
there has been no sale made.
100. A question arises as to what competition or whose competitors are
protected by this section. The competition protected may be that with the
seller or the buyer or the customers of either of them, as under Section 1;
or it may be that with the buyer, as under the first provisions of Section
3; or it may be with the seller alone. On literal interpretation, the provi-
sions refer to competition in generic terms, and therefore prohibit price-
cutting where the purpose is to injure competition anywhere and with
anyone. As a practical matter, a seller will ordinarily cut prices only for
the purpose of injuring his own competitors.
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granting of a quantity discount, that it merely reflected a true
functional discount, and that it was made in good faith to meet
competition, or to exercise the seller's right to select his own
customers, would all be available under these provision of the
third section, since the existence of any of these justifying cir-
cumstances would negative the wrongful intent, which is an in-
tegral part of the offense here prohibited. Furthermore the ele-
ments of a discrimination under Section 1 would necessarily be
present in any case of local price cutting-since this section like-
wise applies only to acts in, or affecting, interstate commerce,
since the intent to injure competition would undoubtedly tinge
the acts with a tendency to injure it, and since prices exacted
in one part of the country can be said to be lower than those
exacted by the same seller in another part of the country only
in relation to goods of the same grade and quality.
The one provision of Section 3 which clearly goes beyond any-
thing contained in Section 1, or for that matter in the previous
law, is the prohibition against selling goods "at unreasonably low
prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a
competitor." The standard set up by this provision is not a rela-
tive one, such as "discrimination," but is an absolute one, con-
sequently, while the other price provisions of this law apply only
where there are two or more transactions by the same seller,
this offense may exist by virtue of only one transaction, or series
of transactions. What will be unreasonably low prices will, of
course, be a question of fact in every case, generally to be decided
by the jury. It is not unlikely that the reasonableness of the price
may depend somewhat upon the intent with which it was adopted
-since intent is the gist of the offense under this provision.
CONCLUSION
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that the
Robinson-Patman Act, although poorly drafted and carelessly en-
acted, does not work a sweeping change in that part of the anti-
trust law which relates to price discrimination. At most it makes
articulate and emphasizes interpretations and developments un-
der the former law. It is true that this act raises some difficul-
ties of interpretation, but these are small in number and not
important in scope when they are carefully distinguished from
the questions of fact which the law raises, and which of course
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no law can settle. It is believed that these ambiguities in the Act
will be resolved pursuant to well-established principles of statu-
tory interpretation and that their resolution in this manner will
be consistent with the law as a whole and will not mark this
legislation as revolutionary. There is no reason to believe that
either the courts or the Federal Trade Commission are going to
use this law to harass legitimate business enterprises, for in its
general purport it merely seeks to accomplish the result which
it has been the universal concern of trade associations to achieve
throughout the last twenty years. Whether or not the economic
theory upon which this law is based in is keeping with modern
tendencies, or whether it is 75 years behind the times is not a
legal question. It is certain, however, that the legislation itself
raises no problems that cannot be solved by the use of current
legal methods.
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